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Ultracrepidarianism in Forensic
Science: The Hair Evidence Debacle
David H. Kaye*
Abstract
For over 130 years, scientific sleuths have inspected hairs
under microscopes. Late in 2012, the FBI, the Innocence Project,
and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers joined
forces to review thousands of microscopic hair comparisons
performed by FBI examiners over several of those decades. The
results have been astounding. Based on the first few hundred
cases in which hairs were said to match, it appears that examiners
exceeded the limits of science in over 90% of their reports or
testimony. The disclosure of this statistic has led to charges that
the FBI faked an entire field of forensic science, placed
pseudoscience in the witness box, and palmed off virtually
worthless and scientifically indefensible evidence as scientific
truth.
This essay disputes these interpretations of the 90+% figure.
Based on some of the scientific literature on hair comparisons, the
public descriptions of the hair review project that have emerged,
and some of the confessions of scientific error that the FBI has
issued, it reaches three conclusions: (1) associating two hairs by
their physical features can be slightly probative of whether they
originated from the same source; (2) the hair review project does
not bear on the validity of these associations or the quality of the
examinations; rather, it is supposed to flag cases in which
examiners have overstated the power of a match to identify the
source of the trace evidence; (3) some questionable determinations
* Associate Dean for Research and Distinguished Professor, School of
Law, and Faculty Member, Graduate Program in Forensic Science, The
Pennsylvania State University. I am grateful to Lynn Garcia and David Moran
for information on the FBI’s Microscopic Hair Comparison Analysis Review and
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have been issued, and the 90+% figure may not be a valid and
reliable measure of overclaiming.
To promote a more complete understanding of the nature and
extent of overclaiming, the review process should be made more
transparent, and the materials it produces should be readily
available for researchers and the public to study. New state or
local evidence reviews should be designed with these concerns in
mind. Finally, in all areas of forensic science, clear standards for
presenting identification evidence without overclaiming should be
devised, and training and monitoring programs should be
implemented to ensure that laboratory personnel and prosecutors
adhere to them.
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I. Introduction
Forensic-science practitioners commonly present findings
regarding traces left at crime scenes, on victims or suspects, or on
or in their possessions. Such trace evidence can take many forms.
Physical traces such as fingerprints, striations on bullets, shoe
and tire prints, and handwritten documents are common
examples. Biological materials, such as blood, semen, saliva, and
hairs also are fodder for the crime laboratory. Comparisons of a
questioned and known sample can supply valuable information
on whether a specific suspect is associated in some manner with a
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crime.1 Viewers of the acronymious police procedurals—NCIS,
CSI, and Law and Order SVU—know all of this.
For decades, however, legal and other academics have
questioned the hoary courtroom claims of absolutely certain
identification of one and only one possible source of trace
evidence.2 In the aftermath of the 2009 report of a National
Research Council committee,3 these views have slowly gained
traction in the forensic-science community. Indeed, in the popular
press and among investigative reporters, the pendulum may be
swinging in favor of uncritical rejection of once unquestioned
forensic sciences. Recent months have seen an episode from
Frontline presenting DNA evidence as “anything but proven”;4
they have included unfounded reports that as many as 15% of
men and women imprisoned with the help of DNA evidence at
trial are wrongfully convicted;5 and award-winning journalists
1. Association is not necessarily causation. There may be innocent
explanations for an impression or other trace that points to an individual. Thus,
forensic scientists distinguish between “source level,” “activity level,” and
“offense level” propositions. See COLIN G. G. AITKEN & FRANCO TARONI,
STATISTICS AND THE EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE FOR FORENSIC SCIENTISTS 215–17
(2d ed. 2004) (discussing the relationship between association and causation); cf.
DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EXPERT
EVIDENCE 601 (2d ed. 2011) (categorizing “hypotheses that might explain a
reported match between samples said to be from the defendant and from a crime
scene”).
2. See, e.g., David H. Kaye, Probability, Individualization, and
Uniqueness in Forensic Science Evidence: Listening to the Academies, 75 BROOK.
L. REV. 1163, 1164 n.10 (2010) (citing some of the critical literature); D. Michael
Risinger & Michael J. Saks, A House with No Foundation, 20 ISSUES SCI. &
TECH. 35 (2003) (arguing that many forensic techniques used in courtroom
proceedings rest on weak science); D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of
Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting
Identification “Expertise”, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731 (1989) (examining the
importance and shortcomings of expert handwriting identification evidence).
3. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE
FORENSIC SCI. CMTY., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES:
A PATH FORWARD 47 (2009).
4. Some inaccuracies in the documentary are noted in David H. Kaye,
Frontline’s Expose of DNA Testing: Yes and No, FORENSIC SCI., STAT.& L. (June
24, 2015), http://for-sci-law-now.blogspot.com/2015/06/frontlines-expose-of-dnatesting-yes.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2015) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
5. See David H. Kaye, DNA Evidence Causes Wrongful Convictions 15% of
the Time!?, FORENSIC SCI., STAT. & L. (July 3, 2015), http://for-sci-law-
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have spread the word that the FBI “faked an entire field of
forensic science,”6 placed “pseudoscience in the witness box,”7 and
palmed off “virtually worthless” evidence as scientific truth.8
The last set of reports stem from an ongoing review of well
over 20,000 cases in which the FBI issued reports on hair
associations.9 The review spans decades of hair comparisons, and
it is showing so many questionable statements that the expert
evidence on hair associations stands out as “one of the country’s
largest forensic scandals.”10 Its preliminary findings provoked
prominent Senators to speak of an “appalling and
chilling . . . indictment of our criminal justice system”11 and to

now.blogspot.com/2015/07/dna-evidence-causes-wrongful.html (last visited Sept.
24, 2015) (debunking this assertion of the Rand Corporation) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
6. Dahlia Lithwick, Pseudoscience in the Witness Box: The FBI Faked an
Entire Field of Forensic Science, SLATE (Apr. 22, 2015, 5:09 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/04/fbi_s_fla
wed_forensics_expert_testimony_hair_analysis_bite_marks_fingerprints.html
(last visited Sept. 22, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
7. Id. These “shameful, horrifying errors” comprised “a story so
horrifying . . . that it would stop your breath.” Id.
8. Erin Blakemore, FBI Admits Pseudoscientific Hair Analysis Used in
Hundreds of Cases: Nearly 3,000 Cases Included Testimony About Hair Matches,
A Technique That Has Been Debunked, SMARTNEWS (Apr. 22, 2015),
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/FBI-Admits-Pseudoscientific-HairAnalysis-Used-in-Hundreds-of-Cases-180955070/?no-ist (last visited Sept. 22,
2015) (quoting Ed Pilkington, Thirty Years In Jail For A Single Hair: The FBI’s
‘Mass Disaster’ of False Conviction, GUARDIAN (Apr. 21, 2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/21/fbi-jail-hair-mass-disasterfalse-conviction) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
9. Norman L. Reimer, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers,
Microscopic Hair Comparison Evidence Audit of 2013, Address at Texas
Criminal Justice Integrity Unit and Texas Forensic Science Commission
Meeting (July 11–12, 2013) (“The FBI has discovered over 21,000 cases so far in
which FBI hair examiners issued a report. Of the first 11,000 cases reviewed,
reports finding a positive association between a questioned hair and a suspect’s
hair were discovered in approximately 1,650 cases.”).
10. Spencer S. Hsu, FBI Admits Flaws in Hair Analysis over Decades,
WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/fbioverstated-forensic-hair-matches-in-nearly-all-criminal-trials-fordecades/2015/04/18/39c8d8c6-e515-11e4-b510-962fcfabc310_story.html
(last
visited Sept. 22, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
11. Id. (quoting Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.)).
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call for a “root cause analysis”12 of ubiquitous errors. A distressed
Department of Justice and FBI joined with the Innocence Project
and the National Association of Defense Lawyers not only to
publicize these failings but also to call on states “to conduct their
own independent reviews where . . . examiners were trained by
the FBI.”13 Projecting the outcome of cases that have yet to be
reviewed, post-conviction petitions refer ominously to
“[t]housands of . . . cases the Justice Department now recognizes
were infected by false expert hair analysis”14 and
“pseudoscientific nonsense.”15
This Essay uses the hair scandal to differentiate two related
problems with many types of forensic-science testimony. The first
is the problem of foundation—what reasons are there to believe
that hair or other analysts possess sufficient expertise to produce
relevant evidence of associations between known and unknown
samples? For years, commentators and some defense counsel
have posed legitimate questions—with little impact in the
courts—about the reliability and validity of physical comparisons
by examiners asked to judge whether known and unknown
samples are similar in enough respects—and not too dissimilar in
other respects—to support a claim that they could have
originated from the same individual.16 To paraphrase Gertrude
12. Id. (quoting S. Judiciary Comm. Chairman Charles E. Grassley (RIowa) and Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.)).
13. Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, FBI Testimony on
Microscopic Hair Analysis Contained Errors in at Least 90 Percent of Cases in
Ongoing Review (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/pressreleases/fbi-testimony-on-microscopic-hair-analysis-contained-errors-in-at-least90-percent-of-cases-in-ongoing-review.
14. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2–3, Ferguson v. Steele, 134 S. Ct.
1581 (2014).
15. Id. at 19. Justice Breyer views the “errors” referred to in the press
release as emblematic of “flawed forensic testimony” generally and a reason to
hold the death penalty unconstitutional. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
16. See, e.g., Simon A. Cole, Fingerprinting: The First Junk Science?, 28
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 73, 76 (2003) (arguing that fingerprint examination is not
forensic science but rather “experience-based practice”); Robert Epstein,
Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint “Science” Is Revealed, 75 S.
CAL. L. REV. 605, 607 (2002) (arguing that “a ‘science of fingerprints’ [is] an
unfounded creation of law enforcement fingerprint examiners”); Clive A.
Stafford Smith & Patrick D. Goodman, Forensic Hair Comparison Analysis:
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Stein, is there enough “there there” to warrant any form of
testimony about a positive association?17 This is the existential
question of whether “[t]he subject of an expert’s testimony [is]
‘scientific . . . knowledge.’”18 Or, at the other extreme, is the entire
enterprise ersatz—a “fake science” and a “worthless” endeavor?
Part I of this Essay discusses this foundational question for
physical hair comparisons. It rejects the harsh view that this
endeavor is pure pseudoscience, like astrology, graphology,
homeopathy, or metoposcopy, and argues that hair analysts
generally possess some expertise in making associations.19
The second problem lies in the presentation of perceived
associations. Even if there is a there there, are forensic-science
practitioners staying within the boundaries of their demonstrated
expertise? Or are they purporting to know more than they do?
Part II of Essay shows that the FBI’s revelations are limited to
this issue of overclaiming. What the FBI has uncovered are
expert assertions in one case after another that are said to
outstrip the core of demonstrated knowledge. Such overclaiming
is one form of scientifically invalid testimony,20 but it is not the
Nineteenth Century Science or Twentieth Century Snake Oil?, 27 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 227, 231 (1996) (“If the purveyors of this dubious science [forensic
hair analysis] cannot do a better job of validating hair analysis than they have
done so far, forensic hair comparison analysis should be excluded altogether
from criminal trials.”); see sources cited supra note 2 (discussing flaws in claims
that forensic-science comparisons are entirely definitive).
17. “What was the use of my having come from Oakland . . . there is no
there there.” GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY’S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 289 (1937).
18. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–90 (1993).
19. It does not attempt to resolve the legal question of whether this
foundational evidence is enough to justify admission of findings of associations
at trial under the rules governing expert evidence. For a short argument that
hair evidence is inadmissible under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., see 4 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 30:48, at 78–79 (2014). The argument faces a
veritable wall of contrary case law. See Meskimen v. Commonwealth, 435
S.W.3d 526, 535–36 (Ky. 2013) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting hair sample evidence); Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 30
A.3d 1111, 1141 (Pa. 2011) (claiming that hair microscopy is an accepted and
reliable scientific technique); PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED,
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 24.03, at 651–57 (4th ed. 2007) (reporting that most
courts are receptive to hair analysis).
20. For this vocabulary, see generally Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J.
Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA.
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equivalent of an entire invalid science. In addition, Part II
questions the uncritical use of the proportion of problematic cases
identified by the FBI as an estimate of the prevalence of
scientifically indefensible testimony.
II. Matching Versus Guessing: Do Hair Examiners Have Anything
to Offer?
Contrary to the more breathless accounts, the testimony of
hair examiners—including the mistaken judgments that have
contributed to wrongful convictions—did not emanate from a
worthless pseudoscience. As a means of making positive
associations between samples, they have been largely superseded
by (generally) more definitive and (always) less subjective
mitochondrial DNA typing.21 Yet, mitotyping also proved that
physical comparisons can be probative of identity. It is worth
examining a few numbers to see how. In an intriguing study
(usually cited as proof of the failings of microscopic hair
comparisons),22 FBI researchers looked at human hairs submitted
to the FBI laboratory for analysis between 1996 and 2000 in which
examiners had first conducted microscopic comparisons and tried to
mitotype them afterward.23 They counted the number of

L. REV. 1 (2009). Cf. Eric S. Lander, Fix the Flaws in Forensic Science, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 21, 2015 (“The F.B.I. stunned the legal community on Monday with
its acknowledgment that testimony by its forensic scientists about hair
identification was scientifically indefensible in nearly every one of more than
250 cases reviewed.”).
21. See DAVID H. KAYE, THE DOUBLE HELIX AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 226–
38 (2010). Mitotyping has not eliminated the need for physical comparisons. Id.
Hair comparisons are still used to screen cases for mitotyping, and in some
instances, hairs with similar physical features lack sufficient DNA for
mitotyping. E.g., State v. Dotson, 450 S.W.3d 1, 36 (Tenn. 2014) (discussing
DNA testing and its resulting evidence). In addition, mitotyping generally
cannot distinguish between individuals who are maternally related.
22. E.g., Reimer, supra note 9; RICHARD SAFERSTEIN, FORENSIC SCIENCE: AN
INTRODUCTION 418 (2d ed. 2011).
23. Max M. Houck & Bruce Budowle, Correlation of Microscopic and
Mitochondrial DNA Hair Comparisons, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1 (2002).
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concordant and discordant results of the two procedures to obtain
the figures shown in Table 1.24

Microscopy +

Mitotyping +
69

Mitotyping −
9

Microscopy −

0

17

Table 1. Comparison of Inclusions (+) and Exclusions (−) in Microscopic Hair
Analyses with Those in Mitochondrial DNA Typing.

Every time mitotyping indicated a positive association, so did
the previous microscopic inspections.25 Thus, with mitotyping as
the “gold standard,”26 the sensitivity of the microscopic analysis
in the cases studied was 69/(69+0) = 100%. Of course, some of
these concordances might have been lucky guesses or influenced
by extraneous knowledge of other facts about the case, but if
these cases are thought of as a random sample from a much
larger population of hairs collected in criminal investigations, one
could say that microscopic hair examiners confronted with truly
matching hairs from this population will declare them to match
at least 95% of the time.27
For the 9 + 17 = 26 exclusions by mitotyping, the
microanalysts reached the same conclusion as the DNA
analysts—an exclusion—in seventeen cases, for a specificity of
65% (with a confidence interval of 44% to 83%). To put it another
way, the physical hair analysis produced nine false positive
associations out of the twenty-six cases in which mitotyping
24. Table 1 is derived from id. at 3, Table 2. It omits all cases in which hair
examiners or DNA analysts could not reach a conclusion as to association.
25. In another fifteen cases, the mitochondrial match was preceded by an
inconclusive microscopic comparison. Mitotyping in an additional thirteen cases
produced a match when no microscopic comparison had been conducted,
presumably because the hair sample was too limited. Id.
26. In clinical medicine, a “gold standard” is the best single test (or a
combination of tests) for diagnosing a disease. A validation study for another
method measures performance against this the gold-standard test. E.g.,
Christopher D. Saudek et al., A New Look at Screening and Diagnosing Diabetes
Mellitus, 93 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 2447 (2008).
27. The approximate 95% confidence intervals for the quantities given in
the
text
were
computed
with
MedCalc,
https://www.medcalc.org/calc/diagnostic_test.php.
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excluded the hairs and microscopic examinations had yielded
either positive or negative associations (35%). However, there
also were twenty cases of mitochondrial exclusions preceded by
inconclusive microscopy. These were not false positive errors.
Thus, it could be argued that the proportion of false positives was
“only” 9/46 = 20%.28 Whichever denominator applies, the nine
false positives were cases in which microanalysis gave not only
the wrong answer but an answer that could have contributed to a
false conviction in the absence of confirmatory mitotyping.29
This false positive rate is cause for concern—and a factor
that cuts against admitting findings of an association at trial.30
Still, in the bulk of the cases of same-source hairs, the procedure
gave the correct answer. It is not as if the analysts were flipping
coins, tossing oracle bones, or dealing Tarot cards. Those methods
would be just as likely to produce a declared association when
hairs really are associated as when they are not. In contrast, the
probability of an FBI examiner finding of a positive association
when comparing hairs from the same individual exceeded the
probability of this finding when comparing hairs from different
individuals by a factor of 100/35 = 2.9 (with a confidence interval
of 1.7 to 4.9). Evidence like this is weakly diagnostic of an
association.31
28. In another thirty-four cases, no microscopic comparisons were
undertaken. Houck & Budowle, supra note 23, at 3, Table 2.
29. For still other statistics on the correlation between the microscopic and
mitochondrial tests, see MAX HOUCK & JAY SIEGEL, FUNDAMENTALS OF FORENSIC
SCIENCE 310 (3d ed. 2015).
30. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) (“[T]he
court ordinarily should consider the known or potential rate of error.”); Paul C.
Giannelli, FBI Review of Microscopic Hair, 29 CRIM. JUST. 31, 31 (reporting on
the FBI’s use of microscopic hair analysis).
31. By way of comparison, the positive likelihood ratio for the nitrite
dipstick test and the Uriscreen test for urinary tract infection are .27/.06 = 4.5,
and 1/.32 = 3.1, respectively. Anthony K. Akobeng, Understanding Diagnostic
Tests 1: Sensitivity, Specificity and Predictive Values, 96 ACTA PÆDIATRICA 338,
339 (2006). The ratio for the PSA test for prostate cancer is approximately .7/.1
= 7. Carvell T. Nguyen & Michael W. Kattan, Prediction Models in Prostate
Cancer Diagnosis, in PROSTATE CANCER DIAGNOSIS: PSA, BIOPSY AND BEYOND 85,
86 (J. Stephen Jones ed., 2012). Such values are disappointing for a clinical test,
and no clinician would want to rely on these tests alone. Nevertheless, the
numbers mean that the tests have some diagnostic value. Courts have been
impressed with even smaller relative risks in epidemiologic studies. See, e.g., In
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A further indication that microscopic hair features have some
value in separating same-source from different-source hairs
comes from research published and debated in reputable journals
since 1974. In that year, a Canadian forensic scientist32 and a
professor of mathematical statistics33 described “An Attempt at
Determining Probabilities in Human Scalp Hair Comparison.”34
In essence, hair analysts coded many features of a cross-section of
about 9 hairs from each of 100 scalps.35 Out of the recorded
re Actos (Pioglitazone) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 6:12–cv–00064–RFD–PJH, 2014
WL 4364832 (W.D. La. Sept. 2, 2014) (treating a relative risk of less than three
as helping establish a clinically significant hazard of bladder cancer from
defendant’s drug).
Even the sharpest critics of hair comparisons seem to regard them as useful for
excluding suspects. E.g., Editorial, Junk Science at the F.B.I., N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
27, 2015, at A18 (discussing uses of hair comparison evidence). A method that
reliably excludes even a fraction of possible suspects who are not the source
increases the probability that an included suspect is the source. Thus, before
more discerning DNA testing was available, courts recognized that even
common blood types are admissible as evidence of identity. KAYE, supra note 21.
If a hair has been shed from a person with type O blood (as established by a
serologic test of the hair sheath), the positive likelihood ratio is about 2 (see
LAURA DEAN, BLOOD GROUPS AND RED CELL ANTIGENS ch. 5 (2005),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK2267/), which is comparable to that for a
microscopic association. On the other hand, blood grouping results are unlikely
to be influenced by knowledge of extraneous facts about the case. Hair
comparisons could be influenced by examiner expectations from facts about guilt
or innocence. If the examiners had access to this information, some of their
success in reaching the same outcomes as the mitotyping could be a reflection of
that knowledge, rather than their professed skill at matching just the features
in the hairs.
32. Barry Douglas Gaudette (1947–2003) “served 33 years as a Forensic
Scientist with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, most recently as Manager of
the Canadian Police Research Centre, a collaboration of the National Research
Council, Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canadian Association of
Chiefs of Police.” “DNA” 2003 Obituary, ONTARIO GENEALOGICAL SOC’Y
PROVINCIAL
INDEX
(Oct.
4,
2003),
https://www.ogs.on.ca/ogspi/2003/o2003dna.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2015) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
33. Professor E. S. Keeping was head of the Department of Mathematics at
the University of Alberta from 1954 to 1961. WALTER HUGH JOHNS, A HISTORY OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA, 1908–1969 317 (1981).
34. Barry D. Gaudette & E. S. Keeping, An Attempt at Determining
Probabilities in Human Scalp Hair Comparison, 19 J. FORENSIC SCI. 599 (1974).
35. See id. at 599 (stating that the actual number varied from six to eleven
hairs selected to be representative of the variation seen in “80 to 100 hairs
randomly selected from various regions of the scalp”).
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feature sets of all the 366,630 pairs of these nearly 900 hairs from
different individuals, only 9 matched.36 The probability of a false
association was therefore 9/366,630 = 1/40,737. If p is the
probability that a single hair from individual A will match a
randomly chosen hair from individual B, then the probability of a
non-match is 1 ─ p. Hence, the probability of all 9 false inclusions
is (1 ─ p)9 = 1/40,737. Solving for p gives an approximate average
probability of a false inclusion per hair of 1/4500.37
This particular number should not be regarded as an error
rate for actual forensic hair comparisons. As the literature
discussing and extending this study reveals, applying this
average probability to casework requires heroic assumptions.38
The hairs in the study may not have been representative of a
population appropriate for casework, and the method used for
matching those hairs differs from that in practice.39 For a witness
to claim this level of accuracy in a given case or to assure a court
that hair analysts are generally this accurate would amount to
“misinformation.”40 Nevertheless, the “average probability”41
36. See id. at 602 (comparing 861 hairs, giving rise to 370,230 distinct
pairs in total and to 370,230 − 3,600 = 366,630 pairs from different individuals).
37. See THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN
THE COURTS 65 (Stephen E. Fienberg ed., 1988) (citing Barry D. Gaudette, A
Supplementary Discussion of Probabilities and Human Hair Comparison, 27 J.
FORENSIC SCI. 279 (1982)) (stating that false matches in multiple comparisons
are assumed to be independent, but “independence is not an important
assumption since the use of the Bonferroni inequality yields an upper bound for
the probability in question of 1/4,526”).
38. Id. at 66; see Walter F. Rowe, The Current Status of Microscopical Hair
Comparisons, 1 SCI. WORLD 868, 872–73 (2001) (reviewing the Gaudette-andKeeping study and the subsequent literature); Smith & Goodman, supra note
16, at 246 (presenting concerns and modifying certain assumptions to obtain an
average false-match probability of 1/261).
39. But see Houck & Budowle, supra note 23, at 2 (“[A] point-by-point, sideby-side comparison of the microscopic characteristics in the known sample with
those in the questioned hair [used in the FBI study] . . . is more reliable than a
simple subjective determination of the properties of an object [used in the
Gaudette-Keeping study].”). The FBI study also involved a second examiner’s
verification, which should improve accuracy.
40. Fienberg, supra note 37, at 67; see also Colin G.G. Aitken & David A.
Stoney, Introduction, in THE USE OF STATISTICS IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 23, 24
(Colin G.G. Aitken & David A. Stoney eds., 1991) (“Average probabilities . . .
have a place in the assessment of the worth of a general area of evidence, such
as head hairs, where frequency data are unavailable. However, it is very
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analysis helps demonstrate that the physical features of hair
provide information on true associations.42
Consequently, summarily to condemn the entire field as
“junk science” from “so-called experts” that “would not make it
within shouting distance of a peer-reviewed journal”43 is illinformed. That being said, there are significant legal arguments
for excluding evidence of hair associations. Although microscopes
are fine scientific instruments, and much is known about the
biology of hair, the process of inferring an association is far from
standardized. Hair examiners have always been clear that “[t]he
conclusions drawn from a forensic hair comparison are subjective
and result from an outgrowth of experience and judgment.
Outside of personal observations acquired through the
accumulated experiences of thousands of hair examinations, little
data exists [sic] to aid the examiner in assessing the significance
of a hair comparison.”44

misleading to quote average probabilities in the courts as a measure of the value
of the evidence.”).
41. AITKEN & TARONI, supra note 1, at 133.
42. Id. at 229–31; see Colin G.G. Aitken, Populations and Samples, in
Aitken & Stoney, supra note 40, at 51, 72 (“[T]he research of Gaudette &
Keeping is valuable, and it showed that hair comparison can distinguish hairs
from different sources.”); cf. A.J. Jeffreys et al., Individual-Specific ‘Fingerprints’
of Human DNA, 316 NATURE 76 (1985) (using a similar calculation to make
extreme claims of individuality for multilocus DNA profiles). A few additional
experiments into the accuracy of microscopic hair examinations, as well as an
extension of the Gaudette-Keeping study, are summarized in Barry D.
Gaudette, Evidential Value of Hair Examination, in FORENSIC EXAMINATION OF
HAIR 243, 250–53 (James Robertson ed., 1999).
43. Editorial, supra note 31, at A18.
44. See Richard E. Bisbing, The Forensic Identification and Association of
Human Hair, in FORENSIC SCIENCE HANDBOOK 184, 210 (Richard Saferstein ed.,
1982)
The merits of each comparison must be independently assessed before
the strength of the conclusion is expressed. Factors such as the
number of unknown hairs found to be similar to the controls, the
number of microscopic features observed, the presence of unusual
characteristics, the condition of the specimens, and the number and
completeness of the exemplars must all be taken into account;
see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, Forensic Hair Analysis: The Case Against
Underemployment of Scientific Evidence, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 41, 62 (1982)
(acknowledging the subjectivity of scientists when categorizing hair samples).
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But “experiences” are not scientific observations,45 and true
expertise does not develop without consistent feedback on
performance.46 As far as scientific research into hair comparisons
goes, the average-probability studies indicate that trained
examiners can code physical features that tend to differentiate
hairs from different individuals. The FBI data on the correlation
between
mitotyping
and
microscopy
indicate
that,
notwithstanding the absence of articulated standards for
measurement and interpretation, analysts can make correct
classifications at levels exceeding pure chance. However, the FBI
data come from one small, retrospective study and the examiners
may have had the benefit of extraneous information indicating
whether the hairs would be expected to match or not. Are the
publications enough to establish a reasonably accurate, generally
applicable, and low enough error rate to warrant admission of the
evidence? Are discrepancies between microscopy and mitotyping
randomly distributed, or are there variables that make the
perceived positive and negative morphological associations—the
inclusions and exclusions—more accurate or less accurate in
identifiable situations? Considering that the FBI has been
combining microscopy with mitotyping for years, it should not be
hard to replicate and extend the 2002 study to address some of
these questions. Thus, the better argument against admissibility
of all microscopic association evidence is not that hair morphology
provides no meaningful information, but that more needs to be
done to demonstrate and quantify the validity of the judgments of
45. See Michael Baum, The Controlled Trial and the Advance of Reliable
Knowledge, 287 BRIT. MED. J. 1216, 1216 (1983) (“The trouble with experience as
a way of approximating to reliable knowledge is that all of us tend to reinterpret
each individual experience in the light of a previously held conceptual
framework.”).
46. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 1, § 10.3.3
Numerous studies have found that without quick and accurate
feedback on correct and incorrect judgments, experience does not
produce expertise and experts routinely overestimate their skills . . . .
Casework in forensic handwriting analysis, latent fingerprint
identification, toolmark identification, and other patterns and
impression evidence comparisons rarely involve . . . feedback based on
ground truth. The argument that the judgments of these analysts are
valid merely because the practitioners have had specialized training
or ample experience therefore is unimpressive.
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associations before accepting the risk that judges or juries will
read too much into hair comparisons no matter how carefully
they are presented.47
Courts have almost always rejected this argument in favor of
the view that hair evidence is not so falsely impressive that it
should be kept from factfinders. No matter the outcome of this
evidentiary question,48 the ongoing FBI review does not probe the
scientific validity of the discipline; rather, it finds a pervasive
problem with the overstated manner in which (weakly) probative
evidence has been presented. But how clear is it that examiners
are exceeding the limits of science nine times out ten?
III. Association Versus Definitive Identification: How Do Hair
Examiners Testify?
There is reason to think that the FBI review project is
casting a wide net in classifying reports and testimony as
exceeding scientifically established limits of our knowledge about
positive associations. Erring in the direction of being overly
inclusive may be a reasonable strategy for notifying defense
counsel of possible concerns, but it is sure to overestimate the
prevalence of error in cases with hair evidence. Reviewers are not
asking whether, on balance, reports and testimony are limited to
a report of a positive association. Rather, they seem to be
searching for any statements that, read in isolation and left
unqualified, would suggest that an individual is the source of the
hair in question.
To indicate the resulting ambiguity in the statistic on
scientifically erroneous testimony, this Part describes the broad
criteria articulated by the FBI and its partners and then draws
on Department of Justice letters to prosecutors and defense
47. See Giannelli, supra note 30, at 32 (“[T]he evidence may have little
probative value, while at the same time be quite misleading.”). The risk that
jury will overvalue scientific evidence of limited accuracy is the raison d’être of
the special scrutiny it should receive under cases such as Frye v. United States
and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. See generally KAYE ET AL., supra
note 1 (discussing topics and issues surrounding admitting scientific evidence).
48. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (explaining this legal
question in greater detail).
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attorneys and on other sources for examples of laboratory
statements that have been deemed erroneous. It concludes that
the high rate of reported errors includes an unknown number of
contestable judgments. Unless the underlying reports and
transcripts are made available for more rigorous research, an
independent, scientifically credible evaluation of any statistics on
the prevalence of errors and their significance is not feasible.
A. The Hair Comparison Analysis Review Project
In July 2012, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced
that it and the FBI had begun to identify “historical cases for
review where a microscopic hair examination conducted by the
FBI was among the evidence in a case that resulted in a
conviction.”49 But “details of how the new FBI review will be
conducted [were] unclear.”50
Over the next year, the Department and the Bureau “worked
closely” with the Innocence Project (IP), the National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL), and pro bono lawyers “in
determining the scope, protocols and implementation of [a]
review [of] more than 2,000 cases that were processed by the FBI
[before] 2000.”51 The most complete published explication of the
protocol for determining whether statements “were scientifically
invalid”52 or exceeded “the permissible limits of the science of hair

49. Spencer S. Hsu, Justice Dept., FBI to Review Use of Forensic Evidence
in
Thousands
of
Cases,
WASH.
POST
(July
10,
2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/justice-dept-fbi-to-review-use-offorensic-evidence-in-thousands-of-cases/2012/07/10/gJQAT6DlbW_story.html
(last visited Sept. 3, 2015) (quoting Department of Justice spokeswoman Nanda
Chitre) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
50. Id.
51. Innocence Project and NACDL Announce Historic Partnership with the
FBI and Department of Justice on Microscopic Hair Analysis Cases, INNOCENCE
PROJECT (July 18, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.innocenceproject.org/newsevents-exonerations/press-releases/innocence-project-and-nacdl-announcehistoric-partnership-with-the-fbi-and-department-of-justice-on-microscopic-hairanalysis-cases (last visited Sept. 3, 2015) [hereinafter Innocence Project] (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
52. Id.
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microscopy”53 comes from the NACDL.54 This article explains that
the reviewers look for “three types of error.”55 A “Type I” error
occurs when an “examiner stated or implied that the evidentiary
hair could be associated with a specific individual to the exclusion
of all others.”56 How the reviewer decides what is implied is
entirely undefined.57 A Type II error exists when an
examiner assigned to the positive association a statistical
weight or probability or provided a likelihood that the
questioned hair originated from a particular source, or an
opinion as to the likelihood or rareness of the positive
association that could lead the jury to believe that valid
statistical weight can be assigned to a microscopic hair
association.58

53. Norman L. Reimer, The Hair Microscopy Review Project: An Historic
Breakthrough For Law Enforcement and a Daunting Challenge for the Defense
Bar, CHAMPION (July 2013), http://www.nacdl.org/Champion.aspx?id=29488 (last
visited Sept. 3, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
54. See id. (explaining that after reviewing the case materials, the FBI will
send its determination to the IP and NACDL for their review, with the aim of
notifying defense counsel or the defendant of erroneous statements).
55. Id.
56. Id. (emphasis added).
57. Illustrating a Type I error, the article offers an easy hypothetical
example:
I found brown, Caucasian head hairs on two items of clothing, the
sports coat, and a pair of slacks that were reported to me as belonging
to [the defendant]. Now, these hairs matched in every observable
microscopic characteristic to that known hair sample of DEC [the
decedent] and consistent with having originated from her. In my
opinion, based on my experience in the laboratory and having done
16,000 hair examinations, my opinion is that those hairs came from
DEC.
Id.
58. Id. (emphasis added). The accompanying example is as follows:
Q: Now, based on your training and experience and your expertise in
the field, and based on your knowledge of hair transfer and hair
comparison, and based on the work done in this case, do you have an
opinion, within the degree of scientific certainty, as to whether or not
the pubic hair found in the underpants of [victim] came from
[defendant]?
A: I would say that it would be a very high degree of probability that
it does. Or to reverse it, I would say the chances of it being from
somebody else, other than Mr. XX, would be highly unlikely at best.
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Finally, a Type III error arises when an “examiner cites the
number of cases or hair analyses worked in the lab and the
number of samples from different individuals that could not be
distinguished from one another as a predictive value to bolster
the conclusion that a hair belongs to a specific individual.”59
Soon after entering into this unprecedented agreement, the
FBI halted its review, allegedly because “[n]early every criminal
case reviewed . . . included flawed forensic testimony.”60 The FBI
attributed the hiatus to “a vigorous debate that occurred within
the FBI and DOJ about the appropriate scientific standards we
should apply when reviewing FBI lab examiner testimony—many
years after the fact.”61 Apparently, the FBI lost the debate. The
Deputy Attorney General ordered the Bureau to proceed “under
the original terms.”62
That was late in July of 2013. On April 20, 2015, the FBI
issued a stunning press release acknowledging that “examiners’
testimony in at least 90 percent of [268] trial transcripts the
Bureau analyzed as part of its Microscopic Hair Comparison
Analysis Review contained erroneous statements.”63 The
59. Id. (emphasis added). The example is: “Now over the last 12 years, I
personally have looked at hairs from about 10,000 different people, and over
that time, I’ve only had two occasions out of the 10,000 people where I had hairs
from two different people that I could not separate them.” Id.
60. See Spencer S. Hsu, Federal Review Stalled After Finding Forensic
Errors by FBI Lab Unit Spanned Two Decades, WASH. POST (July 29, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/federal-review-stalled-after-findingforensic-errors-by-fbi-lab-unit-spanned-two-decades/2014/07/29/04ede880-11ee11e4-9285-4243a40ddc97_story.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2015) (reviewing some
160 cases) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
61. See id. (“‘Working closely with DOJ, we have resolved those issues and
are moving forward with the transcript review for the remaining cases,’ the FBI
said.”).
62. Id.
63. FBI, supra note 13. The press release explains:
The government identified nearly 3,000 cases in which FBI
examiners may have submitted reports or testified in trials using
microscopic hair analysis. As of March 2015, the FBI had reviewed
approximately 500 cases. The majority of these cases were trials and
the transcript of examiner testimony was reviewed. Some of these
cases ended in guilty pleas, limiting the review to the original lab
report. In the 268 cases where examiners provided testimony used to
inculpate a defendant at trial, erroneous statements were made in
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disclosure ignited the media firestorm about “fairytale hair
evidence,”64 a “discredited tool,”65 and an “elite FBI forensic
unit”66 that was “wrong in 96 pct. of cases.”67
Yet, it is not so easy to know what to make of the 90+ percent
figure. Clearly, it does not mean that FBI analysts were wrong to
report and testify to—in some manner—a positive association in
the 268 cases of testimony for the prosecution.68 Although there
undoubtedly are cases in which FBI analysts announced that
questioned and known hairs could have come from the same
source when, in fact, the hairs came from different sources,69
determining “ground truth” in the thousands of cases is all but
impossible. In any event, this task is not part of the review. The
issue before the reviewers is not the scientific validity of hair
257 (ninety-six percent) of the cases.
See also Hsu, supra note 10 (noting that a less-detailed report of these results
came from the DOJ, FBI, IP, and NACDL the day before).
64. Sean Allocca, In the Public Eye: FBI’s Fairytale Hair Evidence and the
Real-Life Consequences, FORENSIC MAG. (July 7, 2015, 10:03 AM),
http://www.forensicmag.com/videos/2015/07/public-eye-fbis-fairytale-hairevidence-and-real-lifeconsequences?et_cid=4663527&et_rid=454869145&location=top (last visited
Sept. 4, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
65. Joseph A. Slobodzian, Hair Analysis a Discredited Tool: FBI Review
Shows It Was Wrong in 96 Pct. of Cases, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, May 12, 2015,
at A1.
66. Hsu, supra note 10.
67. Slobodzian, supra note 65.
68. See FBI/DOJ Microscopic Hair Comparison Analysis Review, FBI,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/scientific-analysis/fbi-doj-microscopic-haircomparison-analysis-review (last visited July 5, 2015) (outlining that the FBI
continues to refer to visual and microscopic comparisons as perfectly capable of
yielding “probative associations” and emphasizes that “microscopic hair
comparison analysis is a valid scientific technique still conducted by the FBI
Laboratory”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
69. See Spencer S. Hsu, Kirk Odom, Who Served 20 Years for 1981 D.C.
Rape, Is Innocent, Prosecutors Say, WASH. POST (July 10, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/2012/07/10/gJQAUjZNbW_story.ht
ml (last visited Sept. 4, 2015) (acknowledging scientific errors after DNA
evidence proved another man was the culprit) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); David H. Kaye, The FBI's Worst Hair Days, FORENSIC SCI.,
STAT. & L. (July 31, 2014), http://for-sci-law-now.blogspot.com/2014/07/the-fbisworst-hair-days.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2015) (discussing the prosecution’s
overstated presentations of microscopic hair associations in two cases) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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comparison as such—although, as noted in Part I, that is indeed
open to question. The issue is not whether the specific judgments
in the cases were gross departures from the norm for ascertaining
when samples could have originated from a common source. It is
not whether claims of a positive association are, ipso facto,
scientifically unacceptable and therefore should not have been
made.
To the contrary, the NACDL and the IP
agreed with the FBI that an examiner’s testimony concerning
the relationship between two hairs is appropriate [to show]
that a contributor of a known sample could be included in a
pool of people of unknown size, as a possible source of the hair
evidence (without in any way giving probabilities, as an
opinion to the likelihood or rareness of the positive association,
or the size of the class) . . . .70

The IP further explained
[I]t is possible to conduct hair microscopy and find similarities
among various samples. But it appears that in many cases the
FBI analysts were overstating the significance of these
similarities, often leaving juries with the false impression that
a hair recovered from the crime scene must have come from
the defendant and could not have come from anyone else.71

In sum, the only issue in the review is whether the
examiners were claiming or implying substantially more than a
“possible source” association. “Possible source” testimony is the
kind that hair examiners have always said they could
legitimately provide. The professional literature has long
acknowledged that microscopic characteristics are not useful for
“absolute personal identification”, but only for “determining
whether or not a questioned hair could have originated from a
particular individual.”72 Experts have testified accordingly.73
70. Reimer, supra note 53.
71. Innocence Project, supra note 51 (quoting Peter Neufeld, co-founder and
co-director). Of course, this concession may have been a strategic one, rather
than a full-throated endorsement of microscopic comparisons.
72. See Douglas W. Deedrick & Sandra L. Koch, Microscopy of Hair Part 1:
A Practical Guide and Manual for Human Hairs, FORENSIC SCI. COMM. (Jan.
2004),
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/forensic-sciencecommunications/fsc/jan2004/research/2004_01_research01b.htm (last visited
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Given the cautions in the professional literature, what is
shocking is that so many examiners so often went beyond the
limits of the knowledge that their discipline claimed.
But how often did this occur? The FBI Hair Comparison
Review does not seek to provide a precise and scientifically
defensible estimate of the prevalence of ultracrepidarian
Sept. 4, 2014) (“The variability and distribution of the microscopic
characteristics are useful in determining whether or not a questioned hair could
have originated from a particular individual [but] hair comparisons do not
constitute a basis for absolute personal identification.”) (emphasis added) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); JOHN W. HICKS, MICROSCOPY OF
HAIR: A PRACTICAL GUIDE AND MANUAL 7 (1977)
[T]he examiner may conclude (1) that the hairs are consistent or
similar and could have come from the same source, (2) that the hairs
are dissimilar and did not come from the same source or (3) that the
hairs possess characteristics which are not sufficiently defined to
arrive at a meaningful conclusion.;
id. at 4 (“[T]he possibility cannot be dismissed that there may be two hair
samples whose ranges of variation overlap and, therefore, a positive
identification cannot be made.”); id. at 41 (“[H]airs do not possess a sufficient
number of unique individual microscopic characteristics to be positively
identified as having originated from a particular person to the exclusion of all
others.”); Houck & Budowle, supra note 23, at 2 (“Microscopic comparison of
hairs has never been considered a positive form of identification.”); NAT. RES.
COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 156 (“[A] conclusion of a ‘match’ means only that the
hair could have come from any person whose hair exhibited—within some levels
of measurement uncertainties—the same microscopic characteristics, but it
cannot uniquely identify one person.”); Forensic Human Hair Examination
Guidelines, FORENSIC SCI. COMM. (Apr. 2005), http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/lab/forensic-sciencecommunications/fsc/april2005/index.htm/standards/2005_04_standards02.htm
(last visited Sept. 3, 2015) (“Individualization is the process of attempting to
determine whether a given hair came from one particular (person) source to the
exclusion of all other sources. This is not possible with forensic microscopical
hair comparison.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). But see
Bisbing, supra note 44, at 203 (allowing for the possibility of “individuality . . .
only under extremely unusual circumstances”).
73. See, e.g., State v. Cameron, 674 P.2d 651, 655 (Wash. 1983) (“[T]he
expert stated only that the hair ‘could have originated from this individual.’”).
But see Tani Watkins et al., The Science of Forensic Hair Comparisons and the
Admissibility of Hair Comparison Evidence: Frye and Daubert Considered,
MCCRONE GROUP (Mar. 2, 2004), https://www.mccrone.com/mm/the-science-offorensic-hair-comparisons-and-the-admissibility-of-hair-comparison-evidencefrye-and-daubert-considered/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2015) (“Most experts testify
that the likelihood of finding someone else with indistinguishable hair is remote,
a rare event.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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testimony. The purpose of the exercise is to notify defendants
whose conviction might be tainted by overstated testimony, along
with the prosecutors, so that they can pursue any appropriate
relief. That is a laudable purpose, but it does not demand
scientific precision. It is better to be overinclusive than
underinclusive in screening for cases of possible injustice. The
Hair Comparison Analysis Review is a massive effort to spot all
cases with statements that should not have been made. As we
soon shall see, the reviewers are not evaluating the nature of the
testimony as a whole by considering whether potentially
misleading statements were corrected or explained appropriately,
and the reviewers could be using contestable criteria for
classifying individual statements as erroneous.
B. How Are the Reviewers Classifying Statements?
A White House task force to protect students from sexual
assault began its report with a statistic designed to underscore
the seriousness of the problem: “One in five women is sexually
assaulted in college.”74 But other estimates are “all over the
map . . . ,”75 in part because of variations in the definitions of
sexual assault and the wording of the specific survey questions
that operationalize these definitions.76 To convey the campus
meaning of “sexual assault,” some colleges supply explicit
examples to cover “the full range of nonconsensual sexual
activity.”77

74. THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE TO PROTECT STUDENTS FROM SEXUAL
ASSAULT, NOT ALONE: THE FIRST REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE TO
PROTECT STUDENTS FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT 2 (2014).
75. Joanne Lipman, The Toughest Issue on (Any) Campus, YALE ALUMNI
MAG., July–Aug. 2015, at 41; see also Sofi Sinozich & Lynn Langton, Bureau of
Justice Statistics, Rape and Sexual Assault Victimization Among College-Age
Females, 1995–2013, Dec. 2014, at 2 (detailing the National Crime
Victimization Study’s findings that the victimization rate was an order of
magnitude less (4.7 per 1,000 for females ages 18 to 24 enrolled in postsecondary schools)).
76. Sinozich & Langton, supra note 75, at 41.
77. Id.
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Just as one cannot make sense of statistics on the prevalence
of campus sexual assault without knowing the details of how the
estimates were obtained, one cannot conclude that 90% or more is
a sound estimate of overclaiming without knowing the specifics
about statements that the FBI classifies as Type I, II, and III
errors. The generic definitions are hardly self-applying, and the
hypothetical examples from the NACDL do not span the kinds of
testimony that actually occur.
To appreciate the problem, it may be helpful to consider the
reports or testimony in a few cases in which the FBI has
confessed error. Ambiguities in the definitions would be academic
if all cases were clear, but the life of the law is more complicated.
The outcome for some cases is obvious enough; for instance, in
one Florida case, the examiner testified that “[i]t’s highly unlikely
that the pubic hair originated from anybody else than Mr. Grady,
and it’s highly unlikely that the head hair originated from
anybody else . . . the chances of that would be almost
nonexistent.”78 This is a clear “Error Type I”—an express or
implied assertion “that the evidentiary hair could be associated
with a specific individual to the exclusion of all others.”
A slightly less obvious example comes from a wrongful
conviction case in the District of Columbia that helped precipitate
the FBI’s review project, where an analyst “said . . . the hair in
the stocking came from Tribble.”79 Such testimony is a source
attribution, but it is not clear from this description whether the
analyst identified Tribble “to the exclusion of all others.” This
phrase was extremely popular among analysts of impression and
patterns (like fingerprints and tool marks) who believed that
their discipline studies characteristics that can exist in their
particulars in only one object in the universe. Of course, the
words “to the exclusion” are logically redundant.80 If the analyst
78. Reimer, supra note 9 (displaying transcript of Michael Malone’s direct
testimony).
79. Maurice Possley, Santae Tribble, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS
(July
21,
2014),
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=392
6 (last visited Sept. 11, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
80. See generally Simon Cole, Individualization Is Dead, Long Live
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believed that “the hair . . . came from Tribble,” then he must have
believed that it did not come from anyone else. However, one
reasonably can believe that a named individual is the source of a
trace—because that is the most likely conclusion—without
believing it is impossible for anyone else to have been the source
(which is most likely what “to the exclusion” was supposed to
mean).81 Thus, there is an ambiguity in the meaning of “Error
Type I.” How explicit and firm must the analyst be in excluding
all other individuals as possible contributors of the hair?82
Now consider United States v. MacDonald,83 one of the most
storied cases in the annals of crime.84 There, an examiner
testified that “this hair—in conducting a comparison examination
with the comparison microscope—microscopically matched the
head hairs of Colette MacDonald.”85 This statement was not
deemed erroneous, since it made no assertion beyond the bare
fact that the questioned and known hairs matched. But upon
being asked on cross-examination why he was not concerned
about the fact that the questioned hair was entangled with a
Individualization! Reforms of Reporting Practices for Fingerprint Analysis in the
United States, 13 L., PROBABILITY & RISK 117 (2014).
81. See Kaye, supra note 5 (discussing the meaning of individualization
and uniqueness in forensic science).
82. One case indicates that “to the exclusion of all others” is not a
limitation at all. In one of two double-murder charges for which Willie Manning
was convicted, an FBI agent testified that normally he could make a source
attribution “to some degree of certainty.” Manning v. State, 726 So.2d 1152,
1180 (Miss. 1998). In this case, he did not do so; rather, he said that because the
hairs recovered from a car “were only fragments,” he could make no comparison
and “was limited to a determination as to the racial characteristics of the hair.”
Manning v. Epps, 695 F. Supp. 2d 323, 380 (N.D. Miss. 2009). The Department
of Justice issued a confession-of-scientific-error letter anyway. David Kaye,
Justice Breyer in Glossip v. Gross on “Flawed Testimony from an FBI Hair
Examiner,” FORENSIC SCI., STAT. & L. (July 16, 2015), http://for-sci-lawnow.blogspot.com/2015/07/justice-breyer-in-glossip-v-gross-on.html (last visited
Sept. 11, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
83. Nos. 3:75–CR–00026–F, 5:06–CV–00024–F, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
64572 (E.D.N.C. May 18, 2015).
84. See generally David H. Kaye, No Relief for Jeffrey MacDonald After FBI
Declares It “Exceeded the Limits of Science” with Hair Analysis, FORENSIC SCI.,
STAT. & L. (May 23, 2015), http://for-sci-law-now.blogspot.com/2015/05/no-relieffor-jeffrey-macdonald-after.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2015) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
85. Id. (quoting testimony of Paul Stombaugh).
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thread, the examiner explained that he was examining it only to
reach a “conclusion” about “its origin.”86 How it had been stored
was irrelevant to that question. The FBI, the NCDL, and the IP
all classified the exchange as a Type I error—an express or
implied assertion “that the evidentiary hair could be associated
with a specific individual to the exclusion of all others.” Never
mind that the examiner had not testified that the hair originated
from Colette MacDonald or anyone else. In this instance, the
reviewers’ judgment that this examiner made a source attribution
of any kind seems questionable.
Moving to some examples of Type II errors, an examiner in
an Arkansas case testified “it is possible for two different people’s
hair to exhibit the same uniqueness, but it’s very rare. . . . [I]t
would be a very low degree of probability of it happening.”87 This
statement does not seem to supply a statistical weight or
probability, but it unequivocally expresses “an opinion as to the
likelihood or rareness of the positive association.” As such, it
clearly exemplifies one category of a Type II error.88 Compare this
with the report in MacDonald stating that “[a] forcibly removed
Caucasian head hair . . . exhibits the same microscopic
characteristics as hairs in the K2 specimen. Accordingly, this hair
is consistent with having originated from Kimberly MacDonald,
the identified source of the K2 specimen.”89
This, the FBI concluded, was also a Type II error. But why?
Again, the examiner had not “assigned to the positive association
a statistical weight or probability.”90 Additionally, he had not
“provided a likelihood that the questioned hair originated from a

86. MacDonald, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64572, at *6; see also Kaye, supra
note 84 (detailing the cross-examination and testimony with further specificity).
87. See Reimer, supra note 9 (displaying an excerpt from the transcript in
Arkansas v. Spencer).
88. See also Duckett v. State, 568 So.2d 891, 893 (Fla. 1990) (“While other
experts could not reach a conclusion by comparing that hair with Duckett’s
pubic hair, Michael Malone, an FBI special agent [concluded] that there was a
high degree of probability that the pubic hair found in her underpants was
Duckett’s pubic hair.”).
89. United States v. MacDonald, Nos. 3:75–CR–00026–F, 5:06–CV–00024–
F, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64572, at *14 (E.D.N.C. May 18, 2015).
90. Reimer, supra note 53.
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particular source . . . ,”91 nor had he expressed an “opinion as to
the likelihood or rareness of the positive association.”92
Apparently, examiners can say that two hairs share the same
features—they “match,” or they are “consistent with” one
another—but must not add the obvious (and scientifically
undeniable) fact that this observation (if correct) means that the
hairs could have had the same origin or that they are “consistent
with” this possibility.93 And even if they add that “[h]air
comparisons are not a basis for personal identification,” as this
examiner did, they have, in the FBI’s view, “exceeded the limits of
science.”94
Of course, one can criticize phrases like “consistent with” and
“match” as creating an unacceptable risk that—in the absence of
clarification on direct examination, cross-examination, or by
judicial instruction—jurors will think the words connote a source
attribution. But this would make their use a Type I error, which
does not seem to be the FBI’s position.95 More importantly,
arguments of this sort stray from determinations that an
examiner has made statements that “exceed the limits of science”
to judgments that an examiner has made statements that are
scientifically acceptable but prone to being misunderstood.

91. MacDonald, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64572, at *5.
92. But cf. supra note 57 and accompanying text (contrasting this example
with a traditional Type II error).
93. Although a statement that two hairs with matching features are
“consistent with” the hypothesis of a common origin seems well within the
bounds of science, the phrase—and various related ones—are far from ideal. See
I. W. Evett et al., The Impact of the Principles of Evidence Interpretation on the
Structure and Content of Statements, 40 SCI. & JUST. 233, 237 (2000) (explaining
why the given phrase tends to “obscure” rather than clarify).
94. Id. (quoting the Department of Justice letter in the case).
95. One might argue that it is poor science to consider consistency with
only the prosecution’s same-source hypothesis and not the defense’s differentsource hypothesis. An expert who wants to use “consistent with” terminology
might testify that (1) the match is consistent with both hypotheses, but (2) it
lends more support to the former as compared to the latter, and (3) there is
currently no adequate basis indicating how much more support it provides for
the same-source hypothesis. This comparative statement about the weight of the
evidence seems scientifically justified. If it were not, the relevance of any
testimony of matching features would be in doubt. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §
195, at 996–97 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 7th ed. 2013).
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To be sure, this latter danger is important to the law. As
noted in Part I, it should inform rulings of admissibility under
Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 702. It is a reason to regulate
the manner in which experts testify to scientifically acceptable
findings, as some courts have done.96 Laboratories themselves
should adopt and enforce policies to ensure that reports and
testimony avoid terminology that is known to convey the wrong
impression. But it is misleading to include scientifically
acceptable, but psychologically dangerous, phrasing in the counts
of scientifically erroneous statements. Case-review projects ought
to flag all instances in which examiners have not presented their
findings as they should have, but reports ought to differentiate
between statements that directly “exceed the limits of science”
and those that risk being misconstrued in a way that would make
them “exceed the limits of science.” One size does not fit all.
IV. Conclusion
For over 130 years, scientific sleuths have been inspecting
hairs under microscopes to ascertain whether particular hairs
could have come from the same person.97 This branch of forensic
science can supply evidence that is weakly probative of identity.98
The Microscopic Hair Comparison Analysis Review initiated in
2012 does not alter this conclusion. Instead, the Review
presupposes that there is a scientific basis for some testimony but
that FBI examiners have been known to exceed what this
foundation supports. Despite the legitimate challenges that can
be raised to the rather standardless nature of microscopic hair
associations, claims that the case review project has shown them
to be a mere pseudoscience that produces wrong answers over
90% of the time rest on a misunderstanding of the nature of the
review.
96. See generally KAYE ET AL., supra note 1 (discussing the admission of
scientific evidence)
97. See Imwinkelried, supra note 44, at 41 (“This year [1982] marks the one
hundredth anniversary of the use of scientific hair evidence in American
Prosecutions.”).
98. See generally supra Part I.
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Of course, as a screening test for overclaiming, the review
project need not meet the publication standards that social
science would demand for a valid and reliable application of the
taxonomy of errors that the FBI and its partners created.
Undertaking that kind of study would not be trivial. It would
require a detailed and relatively unambiguous protocol to guide
the reviewers in their determinations.99 It would include some
demonstration that the reviewers were applying the guidelines
reliably. And it would entail creating a dataset of reports and
transcripts for inspection by other researchers. Ironically, while
the State Department is releasing thousands of pages of Hillary
Clinton’s emails,100 the reports and transcripts held by the
Justice Department are not readily available for independent
scrutiny.
Nevertheless, the ongoing Hair Analysis Comparison Review
already has delivered a crucial lesson to the forensic science
community and the criminal justice system. It seems likely—and
it is deplorable—that many hair examiners have overstated the
probative value of their findings of positive associations—and not
just in the rare and exceptional case. Although just how flagrant
all the overstatements have been is unclear and no precise
estimate of the prevalence of overclaiming is available, there is no
reason to wait for an exact statistic or for more nuanced
measures. Steps can and should be taken in all jurisdictions and
all areas of forensic science to reduce the incidence of
overclaiming. The Organization of Scientific Area Committees
needs to develop clear standards for the limits on testimony about
hair and other forms of scientific identification evidence.101
99. After this Essay was in press, the FBI responded affirmatively to a
Freedom of Information Act request for written instructions received by its
examiners. I plan to discuss this internal guidance document in later
publications on the presentation of trace evidence.
100. See Polly Mosendz, State Department Releases 7,000 Pages of Hillary
Clinton’s
Emails,
NEWSWEEK
(Aug.
31,
2015,
9:04
PM),
http://www.newsweek.com/state-department-releases-7000-pages-hillaryclintons-email-367458 (last visited Sept. 22, 2015) (discussing the State
Department’s release of 7,000 of Clinton’s emails) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
101. Nat’l Institute of Standards and Technology, ORG. OF SCI. AREA COMMS.
(OSAC) (Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.nist.gov/forensics/osac.cfm (last visited Sept.
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Laboratories need to implement or maintain training and
continuing education programs designed to ensure that analysts:
(1) understand what has been scientifically established in their
field; (2) appreciate that impressions of accurate judgments on
their part or on the part of their colleagues are not acceptable
measures of validity or strength of evidence; and (3) know how to
provide answers at trial that reflect these understandings even
when pressed to make stronger claims. Testimony should be
monitored so that expert witnesses receive feedback when they
approach or cross a clear line established by the laboratory for
testimony. Parallel training and monitoring programs for
prosecutors should ensure that they (1) do not make arguments
that overstate the scientifically established power of the evidence;
and (2) do not frame questions that invite the witness do so,
directly or by implication.102 Finally, as the shock brought on by
the 90%+ statistic triggers statewide hair testimony (or other)
review programs, the different types of overclaiming can be
defined more precisely, and appropriate examples from the
federal review can be employed in new instructions to reviewers.
In these ways, the hair evidence debacle can be transformed from
a source of cynicism to a force for maturation.

22, 2015) (“NIST is working with the forensic science community to establish
the new Organization for Scientific Area Committees (OSAC). OSAC will
coordinate development of standards and guidelines for the forensic science
community to improve quality and consistency of work in the forensic science
community.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
102. Judicial orders also can be framed to preclude overclaiming, and jury
instructions can be issued to correct transgressions.

